(NEW) Lydia Amir (Israel)

Lydia
Amir (Israel) - Professor of Philosophy, President of the Israel Association of
Philosophical Practice, lecturer at Tufts University (Boston, USA).
The Human Condition: The Tragic Sense of Life in Philosophy and Its Practice (Lecture)
Presentation Language: English
Prima facie philosophy deals with
the human condition. However, when the tragic sense of life whether gained
through a personal tragedy or a philosophic understanding, is at stake, the
capacity of philosophy to recognize it and effectively address it is
considerably reduced. While it is true that philosophers did and should act as
doctors in the presence of the sick, this has been so at the price of offering
rational consolations that are far from being helpful, unless one is Socrates
or a Stoic sage. This has been the claim of such varied philosophers as Michel
de Montaigne, Leon Chestov (Shestov) and Harold Bloom, based on their own
experiences of illness, terror, and old age. While Greek philosophy begins in
wonder, Kierkegaard argues that Christianity begins in despair, and more
recently, Simon Critchley adds that the true beginning of philosophy is in disappointment.
While the absurd was initially defined by Kierkegaard as the domain of faith
against the realm of reason, the atheist philosophies of the absurd reached new
peaks of absurdity by retaining the term while renouncing the faith it pointed
to, leaving unclear why the human condition is absurd and bordering on bad
faith through gesturing toward hidden mysticism. Philosophy is almost averse to
the tragic sense of life and most of those of adopted this stance turned into
religion. Considered "sick souls" by George Santayana and defended by his
contemporary William James as purveyors of truth in danger of persecution, it
is not clear what philosophy can or should do about those plagued by the tragic
sense of life. As existential questions are amongst the non-controversial
problems that philosophical practice addresses, the lecture addresses the
tragic sense of life, and asks, what is the power of philosophy in its
practical form as philosophical practice in relation to the tragic sense of
life and the threats it represents to finding meaning, to the possibility and
desirability of happiness, and often enough, to life itself?
On the Usefulness of Philosophy - Meaning, Happiness and Misery (Lecture)
In
this lecture, I enquire into the main ways in which philosophy can be helpful
for individuals today. To describe the first way, I state the essential
difference between the psychological notion of therapy, on the one hand, and philosophic
ideals, on the other. I list the main philosophic ideals and show how following
any one of them gives meaning to our lives, by addressing our fear of
meaningless suffering (Friedrich Nietzsche). Depending on the ideal chosen,
this path sometimes minimizes suffering along with the significance it grants
it. Two criticisms of this path yield alternative uses of philosophy. One
criticism states that meanings are lies and the other that ideals are
ineffective, and each comes in either a gloomy or a cheerful version. The first
criticism leads to tragic philosophy. Differentiated from theories of the
absurd, which are still predicated on meaning, tragic philosophies negate
meaning and offer happiness instead. They can be further subdivided into gloomy
(Clément Rosset)
and cheerful theories of the tragic (Lydia Amir). The second criticism states
that ideals are ineffective as each person has to carve her own wisdom. The
cheerful version leads to a revision of philosophy, whose role now is to
educate one 's judgment (Michel de Montaigne). The gloomy version points to the
limitations of philosophy, to the inefficacy of reason once personal tragedy is
encountered and one is disconnected from the rest of humanity as an unfortunate
consequence (Lev Shestov). This view identifies solitude at the core of the
philosophy of misfortune, which is inapproachable by regular philosophic tools.
It remains to be seen if this approach still finds a role for philosophy or
reverts either to literature or to religion for solace. Hence the indecision
about the number of ways in which philosophy can be helpful 150 years after the
birth of scientific psychology.
Philosophical Practice and the Arts (Panel Discussion)
Philosophical practitioners sometimes use various art forms in their
practices. The potential of art forms to supplement or complete philosophical
practice, the comparable suitability of various arts to this task, and the
problems it may create for identifying the practice as philosophical have not
been addressed in depth, to the best of my knowledge. I propose to identify the
main arts that are used in philosophical practices, to explore the reasons
philosophers turn to the arts and the manner in which they incorporate them in
the practice, and to evaluate the desirability of such practices in terms of
their outcomes but also in terms of the desired commonalities of the practice
of philosophy. Reflection of potential uses of art-forms are also welcome is the
discussion.
Moderator: Lydia Amir (Sculping Space)
Participants: Vaughana Feary (Poetry),
Mike Roth (Drama), Ora Gruengard (Literature), Shanti (Painting), Leo
Hemetsberger (Music)
Philosophical Practice and Justice: Uncritical Assumptions, Reasons and Consequences (Lecture)
Is the belief in a just world a fundamental delusion? If yes, should we
worry about the fact that it makes us crueler, as Melvin Lerner's classical
studies have shown, and sometimes, at least, more miserable? Should
philosophical practitioners address cherished, even if vital, yet still
uncritical assumptions? If yes, how? While critically addressing views of
justice may be a task best addressed by philosophical investigation, and, as
such, a constitutive part of philosophy's expertise and responsibility, justice
is an understudied topic in philosophical practice. This lecture describes the
prevalence of our uncritical beliefs in a just world and attempts to find the
reasons for them. It further assesses the risks of challenging our most
fundamental wishes, to which we adhere even when no good evidence can be provided.
Finally, it evaluates the benefits of doing so. This lecture will be the basis
of a workshop held after the conference.